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SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sex and the Public School Teacher: When Is a School
District Liable Under Title IX for a Teacher's Sexual
Misconduct with a Student?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 406-409. © 1998 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
What is the proper standard of
liability for a public school district
under Title IX of the Education
Amendments when a teacher
sexually harasses a student?
FACTS
Alida Star Gebser first met Frank
Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista
High School in Travis County,
Texas, when Gebser was a student
in the eighth grade class of
Waldrop's wife during the 1990-91
school year. At the time, Gebser
was 13.
As a ninth grade student, Gebser
was assigned to Waldrop's class in
advanced social studies. Waldrop,
in fact, was the only teacher who
offered advanced-placement classes
for which students could receive
college credit. During the school
year, Waldrop went out of his way to
flatter Gebser and spend time alone
with her.
Waldrop initiated sexual contact
with Gebser at Gebser's home in the
spring of 1992. Knowing Gebser
would be home alone, Waldrop
visited her there under the pretext
of returning a book. He proceeded
to fondle her breasts and unzip
her pants.
This incident turned out to be the
beginning of a sexual relationship
between Waldrop and Gebser during
which Waldrop had sex on a regular
basis with Gebser, who was then
15 years old. None of the sexual
encounters took place on school
property.
The relationship was halted in
January 1993, when a police officer
discovered Waldrop and Gebser hav-
ing sex. The Lago Vista Independent
School District ("Lago Vista" or the
"District") fired Waldrop, and Texas
education authorities revoked his
teaching license.
Gebser and her mother responded
by suing the District in state court,
alleging a violation of Title IX's sex
discrimination prohibition as well as
claims arising under Texas state law.
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The District had the case moved to
federal court.
Gebser gave a deposition during dis-
covery in the case (see Glossary) in
which she acknowledged that she
did not report Waldrop's conduct to
her family or to school officials or
other teachers. She explained her
failure to make any report by saying
she believed that if she informed
anyone of Waldrop's behavior, "then
I wouldn't be able to have this per-
son as a teacher anymore and that
was my main interest in any rela-
tionship with him." Gebser also
stated that she "didn't know what to
do" because Lago Vista had done
nothing to inform her or other
students about how to respond to
sexual harassment or other
discrimination.
There was no direct evidence that
any school official in the District
was aware of Waldrop's sexual
exploitation of Gebser until the
officer discovered them in January
1993. However, the parents and
guardian of two other students of
Waldrop had complained to the high
school principal that Waldrop had
made inappropriate remarks in the
presence of female students.
The principal investigated those
complaints and confronted Waldrop
who denied the charges. The princi-
pal took no further action and did
not bring the matter to the atten-
tion of the District's superintendent.
The District did have a written poli-
cy prohibiting employees from sexu-
ally harassing students. Under the
policy, any student or parent with a
sexual-harassment complaint could
request a conference with the prin-
cipal or a designee. However, the
District's superintendent, who also
was the Title IX coordinator, appar-
ently did not know that Title IX reg-
ulations require recipient school
districts to put in place a specific
system for sexual-harassment com-
plaints and to inform students of the
complaint system and how to use it.
Lago Vista successfully moved for
summary judgment (see Glossary)
at the end of discovery. In an unre-
ported decision, the district court
concluded that Lago Vista could not
be held liable under Title IX unless
it had failed to act after it had
actual or constructive notice of
Waldrop's conduct. In the court's
view, the District had no such
notice.
Gebser and her mother appealed to
the Fifth Circuit and that court
affirmed. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.
1997). The court reasoned that
"school districts are not liable for
teacher-student harassment under
Title IX unless an employee invested
by the school board with superviso-
ry power over the offending employ-
ee actually knew of the abuse, had
the power to end the abuse, and
failed to do so." 106 F.3d at 1226.
According to the appeals court,
Gebser could not use Title IX to
bring a suit based on the mere fact
that a teacher's employment status
aided in the commission of sexual
harassment.
The Supreme Court now reviews
the Fifth Circuit's decision, having
granted the petition of Gebser and
her mother for a writ of certiorari.
118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The pertinent section of Title IX
provides that no person shall "on
the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any educational pro-
gram or activity receiving federal
financial assistance ... " 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1994).
The Supreme Court has interpreted
the provision to prohibit sexual
harassment, including teacher-
student sexual harassment.
Specifically, in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools,
503 U.S. 60 (1992), ABA PREVIEW
149 (Dec. 10, 1991), the Court held
that a public school teacher's sexual
harassment of a student constitutes
a form of sex discrimination prohib-
ited by Title IX. Moreover, the Court
also ruled that private litigants -
students or parents - may use
Title IX to recover damages (see
Glossary) when a teacher sexually
harasses or otherwise engages in
sexual misconduct with a student.
Unquestionably, said the Franklin
Court, Title IX imposes on school
districts the duty not to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, and "when
a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordi-
nate's sex, that supervisor discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex." 503 U.S.
at 75. That rule, the Court held,
applies when a teacher sexually
harasses and abuses a student. In
the Court's view, Congress surely
did not intend for federal funds to
be expended to support the inten-
tional actions it sought by statute to
proscribe.
The Court in Franklin considered
only whether damages were avail-
able to a harassed student in a suit
brought to enforce Title IX. Thus,
the Court did not consider the
proper standard for imposing liabili-
ty on a school district for a teacher's
sexual harassment or abuse. The
standard of liability was not an issue
in Franklin because, unlike this
case, the school district actually
knew about the teacher's sexual
misconduct.
The role of actual knowledge or
actual notice in Title IX is central to
this case, but in the employment
context covered by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2000e-17, it has little sig-
(Continued on Page 408)
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nificance. Like Title IX, Title VII
prohibits sex discrimination, includ-
ing sexual harassment. Applying
Title VII's prohibition, the Court
has held that an employer without
procedures for receiving sexual-
harassment complaints cannot
assert its lack of knowledge of
harassment as a defense to an
employee's sexual-harassment suit.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Most federal appeals courts to have
addressed the issue have held that
Meritor's actual-notice holding
applies to Title IX's prohibition of
sexual harassment. See Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d
881 (1st Cir. 1988); Kracunas v.
Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir.
1997); Doe v. Claiborne County,
103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996);
Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist.,
94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
Other appeals courts, including the
Fifth Circuit, have taken a different
view after finding critical differences
between Title VII and Title IX.
These courts have imposed an
actual-notice standard of liability.
See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind.
Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.
1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch.
Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th
Cir. 1997), pet. for cert. pending,
(refusing to apply Title VII's stan-
dard of liability to a Title IX
student-on-student sexual-
harassment case).
Lago Vista uses this authority to
argue that Gebser cannot recover
unless the courts are willing to hold
educational institutions strictly
liable for teacher misconduct. The
District claims that the Fifth Circuit
got it right; school districts should
not be liable for teacher-student
harassment under Title IX unless
the offending teacher's supervisor
knew of the misconduct and did
nothing to stop it. In the District's
view, its lack of actual knowledge
means it cannot be liable for
Waldrop's misconduct.
Gebser responds that by requiring
proof of actual knowledge by a
school district's supervisory person-
nel of a teacher's sexual harassment
of a student, public schools would
be held to a lower standard of
liability than is currently the law for
employers. According to Gebser, not
only does an actual-notice standard
misconstrue Title IX, but it provides
no incentive for school districts and
their governing boards to establish
and publicize procedures by which
students may readily complain of
improper conduct before it escalates
to a damaging level.
Gebser urges the Court to impose a
modified constructive-notice stan-
dard similar to the standard fol-
lowed by some courts in Title VII
cases. Gebser argues that school
districts should be liable for sexual
harassment of which they knew or
should have known or for which
they afforded no reasonable avenue
for complaint and redress.
Gebser maintains that no school
district should be able to rely on
lack of actual notice as a defense
to liability for a teacher's sexual
harassment unless it had promulgat-
ed and publicized adequate proce-
dures to uncover and stop misbe-
havior by teachers as quickly as
possible. Says Gebser, in the
absence of such procedures, a
school district should be liable for
sexual harassment and other forms
of intentional sex discrimination,
at least when committed by its
own agents.
Gebser then argues that Waldrop
was an agent of the District because
his status as a teacher made his
abuse possible. Gebser asserts that
Waldrop used his authoritative posi-
tion to take advantage of an adoles-
cent student who, while seeking
college credit, wanted to please her
teachers and fit in socially. In
Gebser's view, the distinct language
and purpose of Title IX and the
unique educational context in
which it operates calls for imposing
liability on a school district for
intentional discrimination, such as
sexual harassment and abuse, car-
ried out by teachers or others who
are aided in their harassment by
their authority over student victims.
Gebser declares that imputed liabili-
ty is consistent with traditional
agency-law principles under which a
principal is responsible for the harm
committed by its agent in situations
in which committing the harm is
facilitated by the authority entrust-
ed to the agent. This standard of
liability, says Gebser, is consistent
with Department of Education
guidelines.
Gebser also argues that imputed lia-
bility would provide a strong incen-
tive for school districts vigilantly to
police sexual misconduct by their
agents. The standard also would
prompt school districts to imple-
ment effective complaint and
investigative procedures and would
be consistent with the responsibility
of school districts under Title IX to
ensure that students are not subject
to discrimination in educational
programs.
Lago Vista contends that Gebser's
agency argument in the context of
this case is equivalent to strict lia-
bility. Such a standard, says the
District, is inappropriate. On this
point, Lago Vista argues that
Congress enacted Title IX under the
Constitution's Spending Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 1. According to
the District, because Spending
Clause legislation is contractual in
nature, Title IX must, but does not,
Issue No. 6408
give notice that a school district will
be held strictly liable for the sexual
harassment and other sexual mis-
conduct of its teachers.
SIGNIFICANCE
The issue in this case recently was
addressed by the Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights
("OCR") in a policy guidance state-
ment announced on March 13,
1997. The statement provides, in
relevant part, that "a school will...
be liable for hostile-environment
sexual harassment by its employees,
i.e., for harassment that is suffi-
ciently severe, persistent, or perva-
sive to limit a student's ability to
participate in or benefit from the
education program or to create a
hostile or abusive educational envi-
ronment, if the employee - (1)
acted with apparent authority (i.e.,
because of the school's conduct, the
employee reasonably appears to be
acting on behalf of the school
whether or not the employee acted
with authority); or (2) was aided in
carrying out the sexual harassment
of students by his or her position of
authority with the institution."
Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or
Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034,
12,039-40 (1997).
The OCR statement clearly conflicts
with the Fifth Circuit's ruling in this
case. Although Lago Vista advanced
the statement as a reason for the
Court to decline to take the case
and although it is not binding on
the Supreme Court, the Court may
conclude, much to the District's
chagrin, that it states the proper
standard of liability and should
apply here.
A decision that school districts
receiving Title IX funds are deemed
to have constructive notice of sexu-
al harassment based on their failure
to issue effective policies and com-
plaint procedures likely would speed
the process of providing meaningful
channels for reporting incidents of
sexual harassment. Of course, such
a holding would greatly increase the
liability exposure of school districts
for sexual harassment initiated by
their employees, making districts
liable for damages for virtually any
incidence of teacher-student sexual
harassment. Although this approach
would provide increased protection
for students, it would impose signifi-
cant costs on school districts that
the districts, unlike ordinary busi-
nesses, may not be able to spread.
On the other hand, a decision
affirming the Fifth Circuit will make
it more difficult for victims of
teacher-student sexual harassment
to recover damages against the
employing districts.
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